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Introduction
At first thought, the relation between analysts' earnings forecasts and their stock recommendations seems straightforward. Presumably, analysts attempt to estimate a firm's intrinsic value (or present value of future cash flows) by first formulating an expectation of future earnings. Analysts then incorporate these earnings forecasts into a residual income valuation model. When the estimated residual income value is above (below) the current stock price, analysts issue a buy (sell) recommendation. Therefore, estimates from residual income valuation models (relative to current price) and analysts' stock recommendations should be positively related.
In contrast to the seemingly straightforward scenario described above, research in the U.S.
(e.g., Bradshaw 2004; Barniv, Hope, Myring, and Thomas 2009; Chen and Chen 2009) documents that analysts historically have not used their own earnings forecasts in setting their stock recommendations. Specifically, these studies use analysts' earnings forecasts to build residual income valuation estimates and show that these estimates relate negatively (or insignificantly for some specifications) to analysts' stock recommendations. In other words, the higher (lower) the residual income valuation estimate relative to the current stock price, the more likely analysts are to issue a sell (buy) recommendation. If analysts develop their earnings forecasts for the purpose of estimating firms' intrinsic values and therefore identifying potentially mispriced stocks, one should expect residual income valuation estimates to relate positively to stock recommendations, but they do not. At the same time, residual income valuation estimates relate positively, while recommendations relate negatively, to future stock returns.
The likely explanation for these apparently peculiar results is that analysts have other incentives (e.g., generating investment banking business, gaining access to management, increasing trading revenue, hyping their own stock, etc.) in publishing their stock recommendations that differ from the idealistic setting. While analysts' recommendations are widely available and used by both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, some prior studies show that they appear to provide no (or biased) information related to future stock performance (e.g., Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee 2006; Drake, Rees, and Swanson 2009; and related discussion and examples in Bradshaw 2009 ). Considerable discussion in the academic literature and business press heavily criticizes the analyst industry as being fraught with conflicts of interest that lead to analysts' published stock recommendations having little or even detrimental value to investors.
We are interested in exploring the extent to which findings in the U.S. generalize to an international setting. To what extent does the divergence of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations in the U.S. also exist in other countries? There has been surprisingly little research outside the U.S. on how analysts use their earnings forecasts to develop their stock recommendations. A likely reason for this lack of research is that recommendations are not part of the standard academic subscription to I/B/E/S. A few published studies investigate the distribution of stock recommendations for an international sample (e.g., Balboa, Gomez-Sala, and Lopez-Espinosa 2009) . These studies do not attempt to link analysts' recommendations to earnings forecast-based valuation models. We use an extensive sample of analysts from around the world to investigate the nature of analysts' two most widely reported outputs -stock recommendations and earnings forecasts.
Our results show that there are interesting differences across countries based on level of investor protection. We find that stock recommendations relate negatively to residual income estimates in strong investor protection countries.
1 Analysts give the highest recommendations to stocks with the lowest residual income values relative to current price. In contrast, in weak investor protection countries, we find that the negative relation between residual income values (relative to current price) and stock recommendations is significantly reduced (or even positive depending on the specification). The results for strong investor protection countries are, at first, counter-intuitive with the notion that analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations should have a more consistent relation. However, when one considers the severe criticism of the analyst industry in the U.S. and other strong investor protection countries, the results are reasonable.
As further support for these arguments, stock recommendations show a stronger positive relation with valuation heuristics -the price-to-earnings-to-expected growth model (PEG) and long-term growth forecasts -in strong investor protection countries, consistent with the greater impact of other incentives in influencing analysts' stock recommendations in these countries.
Analysts are often criticized for using valuation heuristics (as opposed to more rigorous residual income valuation estimates) to support their purposely biased recommendations.
In our second set of tests we examine the extent to which analysts' recommendations and valuation estimates (based on analysts' earnings forecasts) relate to future stock returns. Recall that for strong investor protection countries we find that analysts' stock recommendations relate negatively to residual income valuation estimates but relate positively to valuation heuristics. We find the opposite relation with future excess stock returns. Specifically, we show that future stock returns relate positively to residual income valuation estimates but negatively to valuation heuristics. Combining these two sets of results, one comes to the conclusion that analysts' earnings forecasts are useful inputs into residual income models, but analysts' recommendations do not appear to reflect that usefulness. Instead, analysts in strong investor protection countries rely on heuristics to set their recommendations, and those heuristics do not have a positive relation with future returns. Consistent with the notion put forth in the literature of the greater role of reported earnings in stronger investor protection countries, we find that analysts' earnings forecasts in these countries are more important in explaining future returns when used within the context of residual income valuation models.
Finally, prior research provides evidence that stock recommendations in the U.S. are either insignificantly (Bradshaw 2004) or negatively (Barniv et al. 2009; Drake et al. 2009) related to future returns. Similarly, we show for strong investor protection countries that the relation between stock recommendations and future returns is negative. This is not the case in weak investor protection countries. For weak investor protection countries, the relation between stock recommendations and future returns is positive. In these countries, analysts' recommendations appear to capture information incremental to earnings forecast-based valuation estimates useful for explaining future stock performance.
Our paper provides several direct contributions and generates additional issues for future research. First, we offer the first large study of the relation between analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations across countries. To date, these tests have been conducted exclusively in the U.S. This allows us to combine the expanding literature on the usefulness of financial accounting information across countries (Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski 1993; Ali and Hwang 2000; Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000; Hung 2000; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Hail and Leuz 2006) with the relatively scarce literature on the activities of analysts and the usefulness of their forecasts (Basu, Hwang, and Jan 1998; Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Hope 2003a; Hope 2003b; Barniv, Myring, and Thomas 2005; Finally, some may question whether Bradshaw's (2004) puzzling results in the U.S.
merely reflect error in the data or some omitted correlated variable, rather than true biased behavior. Performing tests across countries offers some additional insight into analyst behavior by allowing us to correlate analysts' outputs (i.e., earnings forecasts and stock recommendations) with country-level features. If those country-level features vary predictably with analysts' incentives to bias their output, then we can make stronger conclusions regarding the nature of the tests.
Strong investor protection countries are characterized by larger capital markets, where 2 For example, in the U.S. the share of foreign stocks in private-sector foreign assets has more than doubled since the early 1990s, with a market capitalization of almost $3.1 trillion by the end of 2005 (Aurelio 2006) . Amadi (2004) shows that the extent of international portfolio diversification has dramatically increased from 1986 to 2001 in all 12 countries examined.
ownership is more widely dispersed across individual (i.e., nonprofessional) investors (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008; Giannetti and Koskinen 2009) . As demonstrated by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) in the U.S., small investors are more likely to naively follow analysts'
recommendations. In contrast, more sophisticated investors discount the optimistic nature of analysts' recommendations, especially those coming from analysts affiliated with the underwriter.
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that analysts in strong investor protection countries are able to gain more (from individual investors) by intentionally biasing their recommendations. Because analysts serve as important intermediaries of financial accounting information, understanding these issues is important to investors and academic researchers.
Several issues remain for future research. Why do we observe differences across countries? Are these differences caused by differences in analysts' underlying ability, their compensation structure, the influence of other factors (e.g., garnering investment banking business, trading revenues, cultural biases, etc.), or some other institutional feature? Have these empirical relations changed over time, and has this change been the result of market-based incentives, securities regulations, and/or accounting standard changes? To what extent do (or should) analysts' stock recommendations incorporate non-earnings-based information as the strength of a country's investor protection laws varies? Are biases in stock recommendations and/or analysts' earnings forecasts directly related to analysts' affiliation with the company or the external financing needs of the company, and do these relations vary with legal regime?
While it is not the intent of our paper to address all of these additional issues, our desire is to provide discussion of these issues and present basic empirical relations, with the hope of motivating future research in these areas.
In the next section we highlight differences across countries related to analysts and accounting information. In Section 3 we briefly describe the valuation models and in Section 4 we discuss our sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides our main empirical findings as well as several additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.
Prior Research and Our Tests
Schipper ( (2) valuation estimates and future returns, and (3) recommendations and future returns in strong versus weak investor protection countries. Based on prior research discussed below, there are reasons to expect properties of analysts' outputs to vary with investor protection.
Relation between Stock Recommendations and Valuation Estimates
An extensive body of academic research, discussion in the business press, and regulatory reforms provide evidence that analysts' recommendations are optimistically biased in the U.S.
Research shows that optimistic recommendations relate to obtaining higher brokerage fees, 3 Similar conclusions are offered by Block (1999) , Bradshaw (2002) , Asquith et al. (2005) , Gleason, Johnson, and Li (2008) , Barniv et al (2009), and Chen (2009) . In the U.K., Barker (1999a; 1999b) documents a preference by analysts for "less sophisticated" models such as using dividend yields rather than present value or dividend discount models. Chen, Jorgensen, and Yoo (2004) document instances in which analysts in France, Germany, and the U.K. also rely on PEG ratios. Similarly, Demirakos, Strong, and Walker (2004) investigate a small sample of sell-side analyst reports for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange and find that inferior single-period comparative valuation techniques are more common than residual income models.
hyping personally owned stocks, generating greater trading commissions, and garnering more investment banking business (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998; Womack 1999, 2005; Irvine 2004 ). The evidence in favor of analysts' opportunistic bias is so overwhelming that few would question that recommendations reflect analysts' incentives other than identifying mispriced stocks. provide further support for the recommendation bias in U.S.
by showing that the frequency of sell recommendations in the U.S. is the lowest among the G7 countries. They cite Gimein (2002) , who claims that investment advice offered by analysts are "so dishonest and fraught with conflicts of interest that it has become worthless." 4 Balboa et al. (2009) find that the distribution of recommendations is most optimistic in the U.S., followed by the U.K. and the Netherlands (i.e., strong investor protection countries). They find the least optimistic distributions in France, Germany, and Japan (i.e., weak investor protection countries).
In comparison to the evidence on recommendations, analysts' earnings forecasts have received much less criticism. Numerous studies in the U.S. support the usefulness of analysts' earnings forecasts to predict future earnings or future stock returns in the context of residual income models [e.g., Frankel and Lee (1998) , Kothari (2001) , Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) , Chen and Ritter (2000) and Ritter (2003) provide evidence suggesting that brokerage firms and thus analysts may have different incentives in the U.S. compared with other countries. Specifically, they document that gross spreads received by underwriters on initial public offerings in the U.S. are much higher than in other countries, and that almost all U.S. deals have spreads of exactly seven percent, which is suggestive of collusion among investment banks. Outside the U.S. there is significantly less clustering of gross spreads (Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm 2003; Torstila 2003) . 5 Other research finds that in recent years analysts' short-term earnings forecasts are, on average, either unbiased or even pessimistic (Brown 2001; Richardson, Siew, and Wysocki 2004; Ramnath et al. 2005; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006; Jacob et al. 2008) , unlike recommendations which have been shown to be consistently optimistic over time. Leuz et al. 2003; Hail and Leuz 2006) . To the extent that earnings are more useful in strong investor protection countries, investors demand earnings-related information, giving analysts incentives to provide more superior earnings forecasts.
From the discussion above, we conclude that analysts' recommendations in strong investor protection countries (compared with weak investor protection countries) appear to be less useful (i.e., more biased) while their earnings forecasts are more useful. Balboa et al. (2009) provide an explanation for these seemingly contrasting results. They argue that more sophisticated users (e.g., institutional investors) tend to rely more on earnings forecasts, while less sophisticated users (e.g., individual investors) rely more on recommendations.
Recommendations are freely available to individual investors and straightforward to interpret. Buy recommendations signal a higher level of optimism than do sell recommendations. In other words, because recommendations are, at face value, easy to interpret and costless, individual investors are prone to using them in their investment strategies.
In contrast, individual investors find it more difficult to act on earnings forecasts as a stand-alone piece of information. It is less clear to individual investors whether earnings forecasts reflect analysts' optimism or pessimism about the stock's performance. In addition,
analysts may be less inclined to issue purposely optimistic earnings forecasts. Since reported earnings and earnings forecasts are precise amounts, it is easy for all investors to discern forecast bias, making the analyst more directly accountable for misleading information. Buy/sell recommendations are more subjective by nature. Our discussion leads to the prediction that it is easier for analysts to bias recommendations than earnings forecasts, and the empirical evidence supports this notion.
These assertions are also supported by findings in Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) .
They find that large traders (i.e., sophisticated traders) tend to discount stock recommendations.
Large traders do not respond to buy recommendations and exert selling pressure on hold recommendations. In contrast, small traders (i.e., less sophisticated traders) follow recommendations literally by exerting buying pressure following buy recommendations and zero pressure following hold recommendations. Furthermore, the discounting of analysts'
recommendations by large traders is more significant when the analyst is affiliated with the underwriter, consistent with large, sophisticated investors being aware of analysts' conflicts of interest. Small traders do not respond differently to whether the analyst is affiliated. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) conclude that information costs cannot explain these results. Rather, the results are due to small traders displaying investor naiveté. Thus, to the extent that small traders exist, there is a "market" for biased recommendations.
One distinct characteristic of strong investor protection countries is a greater proportion of small investors. 9 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) provide statistics for the proportion of households that own stocks directly across 12 countries, ten of which match countries in our sample (we do not include the U.S. or Austria in our study). 10 Of the ten matching countries, half are classified as strong investor protection regimes. In the strong investor protection countries, the proportion of households directly involved in the stock market averages 27.1%. The average is only 8.2% in weak investor protection countries. These findings are confirmed in Giannetti and Koskinen (2009) for a larger sample of countries. Matching countries between our study and theirs, we have 11 strong investor protection countries and 11 weak investor protection countries.
Household participation rate in strong versus weak investor protection countries is 23% versus 12%. From these two studies we conclude that individual investor involvement is much higher in strong investor protection countries. 11 As demonstrated by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) , these are precisely the investors most susceptible to recommendation bias. If it is true that "other" incentives in setting stock recommendations are greater in stronger investor protection countries, and that analysts use heuristics to support their biased recommendations, then the relation between stock recommendations and heuristics is expected to be greater in these countries.
There are at least two competing views to the prediction that analysts' recommendations will relate more to valuation heuristics in strong investor protection countries. First, analysts may truly believe that accounting earnings lack usefulness as a measure of firm performance.
Heuristics provide the necessary "adjustment" to earnings to render them useful. An extensive line of research provides evidence that countries with weaker investor protection regimes have lower quality earnings and/or lower overall financial transparency (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003; Hope 2003a; Leuz et al. 2003; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006) . For this reason, one might expect that analysts in countries with weaker investor protection are more likely to rely on heuristics as a way to adjust reported earnings.
Second, one may consider that in a strong investor protection environment that regulations will better protect investors against misleading analyst recommendations. However, this is inconsistent with views expressed repeatedly in the business press, which contend that the more opaque nature of analysts' recommendations (as opposed to their earnings forecasts) makes it more difficult for analysts to be held directly accountable for their bias. It is certainly the case that prior to recent regulations (e.g., the Global Settlement Act in 2003) the analyst industry in the U.S. was left largely unregulated in the information provided. Compared with the large number of analysts and the large number of companies followed in the U.S., there were relatively few instances of litigation against analysts for providing overly optimistic recommendations.
Instead, based on a very extensive body of evidence, it is clear that analysts' recommendations were optimistically biased for decades in the U.S.
In summary, stock recommendations are optimistically biased, and this bias relates expectedly to analysts' other incentives and conflicts of interest. Interestingly, the bias in recommendations appears to be greater in strong investor protection countries. One reason for this could be that strong investor protection countries have a higher proportion of nonprofessional investors, and these investors are especially susceptible to biased recommendations. Since analysts often use valuation heuristics to support their biased recommendations, one would predict that analysts' recommendations relate more to valuation heuristics than to more conceptually-based residual income valuation estimates in weak investor protection countries. On the other hand, one could also argue that, based on prior research, reported earnings have less value relevance in weaker investor protection countries and therefore analysts use heuristics to "adjust" earnings in setting their recommendations. This leads to the prediction that recommendations will relate more to heuristics in weak investor protection countries. Also consistent with this prediction, in strong investor protection countries, capital market participants may receive better protection from biased analyst behavior. Thus, the literature suggests opposing predictions on whether analysts in strong versus weak investor protection countries are more likely to rely on heuristics instead of residual income valuation estimates in setting their recommendations. We test the following.
Test 1 -Does the relation between stock recommendations and valuation estimates differ in strong versus weak investor protection countries? 2.2 Relation between Future Excess Returns and Valuation Estimates
Prior research suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts are expected to be relevant to investors to the extent that (1) accounting-based earnings provide a meaningful measure of firm performance and (2) analysts provide accurate forecasts. There are reasons to expect both of these conditions to vary across countries.
First, as discussed above, prior research provides the overall conclusion that earnings traditionally have greater relevance in strong investor protection countries. This finding would suggest a stronger relation between future excess stock returns and residual income valuation estimates in these countries.
Second, compared with the literature on accounting differences, the international literature on analysts' accuracy is relatively limited. There is some evidence that the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts varies around the world and that such variation relates positively to disclosure practices and investor protection (e.g., Basu et al. 1998; Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Hope 2003a; Hope 2003b) . Greater forecast accuracy in strong investor protection countries may relate to the increased predictability of earnings because of greater use of accrual-basis accounting (matching principle) and/or reduced earnings management in these countries (Leuz et al. 2003 ).
In addition, greater forecast accuracy may also result from analysts having greater incentives to forecast accurately. In well-developed capital markets where earnings information is considered more value-relevant (i.e., strong investor protection countries), investors may have higher demand for earnings information (e.g., Barniv et al. 2005; . One reason for this higher demand, according to Bushman and Smith (2001) , is that the effectiveness of accounting information in limiting expropriation of minority investors is likely to be greater when investors have stronger protection. In other words, when investor protection is stronger, accounting information can play a more prominent role in corporate governance mechanisms and investors rely to a greater extent on financial accounting information (e.g., Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo 2009). The increased demand by investors for earnings information provides incentives for analysts to provide superior forecasts. As competition among analysts increases, the overall accuracy of analysts' forecasts is likely to improve. In weak investor protection countries, the reduced demand by investors for earnings-related information may reduce the incentives of analysts to expend effort and expertise in providing a superior earnings forecast (Barniv et al. 2005; .
Overall, prior research supports the greater usefulness of earnings and earnings forecasts in strong investor protection countries. These results lead to the prediction of a greater relation between residual income valuation estimates and future excess stock returns in strong investor protection countries. It is also possible that analysts in weak investor protection countries better summarize information about the firm using heuristics (e.g., LTG) as short-term earnings performance is less meaningful in these countries. In this case, the relation between excess stock returns and heuristics is expected to be greater in weak investor protection countries. We explore these issues in our second test.
Test 2 -Does the relation between future excess stock returns and valuation estimates differ in strong versus weak investor protection countries?

Relation between Future Excess Returns and Stock Recommendations
As our final test, we consider the extent to which stock recommendations relate to future excess stock returns, after controlling for valuation estimates. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that market participants demand (and analysts supply) cash flow information when weak investor protection results in earnings that are less likely to reflect underlying economic performance…These findings contribute to the literature by shedding light on the institutional determinants of analysts' research activities, and on the nature of the financial information they generate." These arguments lead to the prediction that the incremental explanatory power of stock recommendations for future stock returns will be greater in weak than in strong investor protection countries. In addition, if analysts' recommendations better reflect opportunistic bias in strong investor protection countries, this would further support a more positive relation between recommendations and future returns in weak investor protection countries.
Of course, it is also possible that the rewards to providing superior recommendations are greater in strong investor protection countries, giving analysts the incentives to be more accurate in finding mispriced stocks. The increased incentives would result in more reliable stock recommendations, on average, and therefore a greater relation between future excess stock returns and stock recommendations in strong investor protection countries. We investigate this issue as our third test. 
where V t is the residual income valuation in year t, BVPS is book value per share in year t, RI t+τ is residual income in year t+τ, and r is the discount rate, assumed to vary with the country's risk-free rate. RI t+τ is defined as forecasted earnings in year t+τ less BVPS in year t+τ−1 times the discount rate. For BVPS beyond year t, we assume the clean surplus relation (i.e., BVPS t+τ = BVPS t+τ−1 + X t+τ − D t+τ , where X is forecasted earnings and D is dividends assuming a constant payout rate from year t). As in Bradshaw (2004) , we estimate two versions of the residual income valuation model that vary based on assumptions of the terminal value (TV). The first, V RI1 , assumes that abnormal profits are driven away over time due to competitive pressures.
Specifically, we build in a fade rate (ω ) that implies that abnormal earnings revert to zero over ten years: The second residual income valuation model (V RI2 ) assumes that residual income in the terminal year persists in perpetuity. This is a more optimistic assumption than the fade-rate assumption used for 
Several studies discuss how analysts use price-earnings based techniques in practice (e.g., Barker 1999a and 1999b; Block 1999; Bradshaw 2002; Chen et al. 2004) . The PEG ratio is defined as:
where P/E is stock price divided by forecasted earnings and LTG is the projected longterm annual earnings growth. Consistent with Bradshaw (2004) , we compute PEG using the twoyear-ahead earnings forecast:
]* *100
Finally, given the documented importance of analysts' long-term growth projections (Bradshaw 2004) , we include LTG as our fourth metric.
Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate valuation models, we collect consensus earnings forecasts and projections of 
13 We have also computed V PEG /P using a one-year-ahead earnings forecast and no inferences are affected.
where r i,t is the monthly raw stock return for firm i and r size,t is the monthly return of the size decile to which firm i belongs as of the beginning of the fiscal year. We cumulate returns beginning in the middle of the month subsequent to the date of the consensus recommendation.
Our sample comes from the period January 1993 to May 2007 and includes firms from 30
countries. We include all monthly observations in which there has been a change in the consensus recommendation (see sensitivity analysis on this below) and I/B/E/S provides consensus earnings forecasts for the current year and next year. We use months with a change in recommendation to reduce the possibility that we are using stale information in our tests. For all observations we require all valuation estimates be available. Thus, the number of observations is identical across models.
14 We use the "Legal Enforcement" variable from La Porta et al. (1998) to proxy for the level of investor protection in a country. It is measured as the mean score across three legal variables: (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of the rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to ten. This proxy for investor protection has been used in several recent studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant 2007; Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, and Stolowy 2007; Hope et al. 2009 ). We further define strong (weak) investor protection countries to be those with above (below) median scores for investor protection.
15 Table 1 provides distributions of the number of observations by country and investor protection regime (Panel A) and across fiscal years (Panels B). Our sample consists of 66,907
firm-month observations from strong investor protection countries and 85,732 firm-month observations from weak investor protection countries. We later provide results of tests in which 14 Results are similar if we relax the requirement that LTG be available (and thus have larger sample sizes). 15 In a sensitivity analysis we alternatively test for the effect of investor protection using a continuous specification.
we hold the sample size constant between strong and weak investor protection countries (and show that results are not affected by uneven sample sizes). Observations from Australia (14, 902) and the U.K. (21,324) make up slightly more than one-half of the strong investor protection sample. Within the weak investor protection sample, the largest samples are from France (16,369) and Japan (13,419). Panel B shows that our sample size increases over time.
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Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean recommendation (REC) for the strong investor protection sample is 3.48 compared with 3.56 for weak investor protection countries. Table 2 further shows that future buy-and-hold one-year size-adjusted returns (SAR) are negative one percent for both regimes. The two residual income valuations are lower for strong investor protection countries than for weak investor protection countries (mean V RI1 /P = 0.69 in strong investor protection and 0.78 in weak investor protection; mean V RI2 /P = 0.82 in strong investor protection and 0.86 in weak investor protection). The fact that the mean recommendation (REC) is a buy and the mean residual income valuation estimates (V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P) are less than one suggests that analysts rely on more than just these valuations when deciding their stock recommendations. V PEG /P is less than one for strong investor protection countries (0.91) and weak investor protection countries (0.93). Long-term growth forecasts are somewhat higher in weak investor protection countries (14.51% versus 10.47%).
The remaining variables serve as control variables in our models discussed below. Firm size, as measured by the market value of equity, is greater for our sample of weak investor protection countries. The book-to-market ratio and standard deviation of analysts'
recommendations are approximately equal across the countries. Next, we observe that there are 16 We have fewer observations in 2007 than in 2006 because our sample period ends in May 2007. more analysts per firm for weak investor protection countries. 17 Finally, we control for other country-specific effects and observe that GNP per capita tends to be slightly greater for weak investor protection countries, and disclosure levels (from La Porta et al. 2006 ) are approximately equal.
Panel B presents pooled correlations. SAR is negatively (positively) related to REC in strong (weak) investor protection countries. In both regimes, SAR is positively correlated with residual income estimates and negatively correlated with LTG. REC is negatively correlated with V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P in strong investor protection countries but positively related to V RI2 /P in weak investor protection countries. REC is positively correlated with V PEG /P and LTG in both samples.
As expected, the correlations between V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P are very high. We also note the high correlation between V PEG /P and LTG. Because of these high correlations, our multivariate tests in the following section include only one of the residual income models and only one of V PEG /P or LTG at a time. Overall, the correlation analyses are consistent with analysts' recommendations being more useful to investors in weak investor protection countries, while at the same time, earnings forecasts (when used within the residual income valuation models) being more useful in strong investor protection countries.
Test Results
Tests of Relation between Stock Recommendations and Valuation Estimates
We regress recommendations on year indicators (Y) and one of the residual income estimates (RESID) and one of the HEURISTICS (V PEG /P or LTG).
17 As a sensitivity test we have estimated all models after excluding consensus recommendations based on just one recommendation and results are similar to those reported. All regressions include industry fixed effects (i.e., ten indicator variables based on the I/B/E/S one-digit SIG codes) as well as six firm, analyst, or country characteristics as control variables: firm size (log of market value of equity), book-to-market ratio, analyst following, the standard deviation of stock recommendations, log of GNP per capita, and country-level disclosure index.
As in Bradshaw (2004) and Barniv et al. (2009) , reported coefficients are based on means from 12 monthly regressions. The 12 monthly regressions are formed by assigning observations to portfolios based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizons (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The purpose of doing this is to control for differences in earnings forecast characteristics and/or stock recommendations as the end of the period nears. Prior research (e.g. Matsumoto 1999; Brown 2001) shows that earnings forecasts made further from the end of the fiscal year tend to be less accurate and more optimistically biased. To prevent these characteristics from confounding our results, we estimate separate regressions based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizons.
Reported t-statistics are based on the standard error of the monthly coefficients, using the adjustment for serial correlation across months. 18 The adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The coefficients are estimated using quintile rankings of the valuation estimates.
The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles based on the distribution of the variable in that month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range 18 Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor,
, where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates (Abarbanell and Bernard 2000; Bradshaw 2004 ).
between 0 and 1.
19 Table 3 presents mean coefficients for the 12 monthly regressions. Panel A (Panel B) presents regressions of recommendations on residual income valuation estimates based on the assumption that the terminal value fades to zero, V RI1 /P, (lasts in perpetuity, V RI2 /P,) and on V PEG /P. In Table 4 , we present results for V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P with LTG.
In Panel A of Table 3 , we find that the coefficients on V RI1 /P are significantly negative for both samples. However, the coefficient is significantly more negative for strong investor protection countries. Analysts in strong investor protection countries appear less likely to be applying their earnings forecasts in a sophisticated manner to derive a stock recommendation, and incentives other than identifying mispriced stocks could play a role. Furthermore, V PEG /P shows a significantly more positive relation with stock recommendations in the strong investor protection countries. In total, these results suggest that analysts' greater reliance on heuristics and lower reliance on residual income valuations in setting their recommendations are more pronounced in strong investor protection countries.
In Panel B, we find similar results for V RI2 /P. The residual income valuation estimate is more negatively related to recommendations in strong investor protections, while V PEG /P is more positively related. These results support our previous conclusion. For completeness, we also note results for control variables. In both panels, stock recommendations are higher for firms with higher market values, lower book-to-market ratios (i.e., growth stocks), fewer analysts, less dispersion in recommendation, countries with higher GNP per capita, and countries with more disclosure.
In Table 4 we include LTG rather than V PEG /P. For V RI1 /P (Panel A), we find that residual income valuation estimates continue to relate negatively to recommendations, but to a lesser degree than when V PEG /P was included in the model (Table 3) . For V RI2 /P (Panel B), the relation between V RI2 /P and recommendations becomes marginally significantly positive for weak investor protection countries, while remaining significantly negative for strong investor protection countries. LTG has a positive relation with stock recommendations, and the relation is significantly greater in strong investor protection countries.
20
In summary, contrary to what one might consider, the results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that analysts' recommendations appear to be most biased toward heuristics and away from residual income valuations in strong investor protection countries. These results are consistent with other incentives having a greater influence on analysts' recommendations in strong investor protection countries (e.g., Ljungqvist et al. 2003; Ritter 2003; Torstila 2003; Chen and Ritter 2000) . In weak investor protection countries, we find significantly less evidence of analysts' biased behavior.
Tests of Relations between Future Excess Returns and Stock Recommendations
We now turn to tests of the relation between future excess returns and stock recommendations and valuation estimates: Tables 5 and 6 . 21 In Table 5 , we include V PEG /P with each of the residual income valuation estimates, while 20 Our finding is consistent with Drake et al. (2009) who document that U.S. analysts tend to over-recommend stocks with high growth. 21 Note that results for all four valuation estimates are unaffected by removing recommendations from the regression (i.e., the estimated coefficients retain their sign and significance).
we discuss both together.
In Tables 5 and 6 , we find that recommendations relate positively to future excess returns, but only in weak investor protection countries. In strong investor protection countries, the relation is negative, indicating that the stocks analysts most recommend perform the most poorly over the subsequent twelve months. The results for the weak investor protection sample contrast those reported in the U.S. (Bradshaw 2004; Barniv et al. 2009; Drake et al. 2009 ), which show that recommendations are either unrelated or negatively related to future returns.
We also note that the relation between residual income valuation estimates and future returns is more positive in stronger investor protection countries. These results are consistent with the greater usefulness of earnings information in these countries, as documented extensively in prior research. In addition, the greater positive relation in strong investor protection countries further highlights the peculiar results reported previously in Tables 3 and 4 , and it appears that this bias is greater in stronger investor protection countries.
Impact of Legal Origin
As discussed above, we have reason to expect that a sample split based on investor protection (strong versus weak) leads to differences in properties of analysts' outputs, but we also note that other country-level factors vary within each subsample. For example, within the 11 strong investor protection countries, we observe that four are from common law countries Table 1) .
Using their data, we find that our four strong investor protection countries with a common law legal origin had an average of 268.3 IPOs. In contrast, the strong investor protection countries that have a code law legal origin had an average of only 15.8 IPOs. Greater IPO activity may induce analysts to provide more optimistic recommendations as they compete for investment banking business (Michaely and Womack 1999) .
The results of the 2x2 analysis of strong investor protection by legal origin are the most contrasting between strong investor protection/common law countries versus weak investor protection/code law countries. 22 Specifically, we find the following: (1) recommendations relate most negatively to residual income values in strong investor protection/common law countries, (2) recommendations relate least positively to PEG valuations and long-term growth forecasts in weak investor protection countries/code law countries, (3) future returns relate most positively to residual income values in strong investor protection/common law countries, (4) future returns relate most negatively to PEG valuations and long-term growth forecasts in strong investor protection/common law countries, and (5) future returns relate negatively to recommendations only in strong investor protection/common law countries. These results further emphasize the cross-country variation in the usefulness of analysts' recommendations and earnings forecasts.
Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests
MATCHING ON INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE
As explained, our tests include several firm-level control variables, industry fixed effects, and country-level controls for GNP and disclosure. However, as an additional test to ensure that firms are comparable, we repeat our main tests after matching firms on size and industry (but still include the firm-level control variables). 23 Specifically, we first sort weak investor protection firms by industry (using I/B/E/S two-digit industry codes). Next, within each industry we sort firms by size quintiles (based on market value of equity). Finally, for each weak investor protection firm we randomly select a matched strong investor protection firm from the same industry and size quintile cutoff. Note that this test also ensures that the sample size is identical for the strong and weak investor protection groups (i.e., it can also be viewed as a control test for differences in sample sizes between the two groups). Results using this matching procedure are 22 Results may be obtained from the authors upon request. 23 Among other things, this sensitivity analysis controls for the possibility that there are more "new economy" firms in strong investor protection countries than in weak investor protection countries. similar to those reported, suggesting that our findings are not driven by differences in industry composition or firm size across investor protection.
RESULTS FOR INTRODUCTION OF IFRS
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were introduced in many of our sample countries towards the end of the sample period. For example, the European Union mandated the use of IFRS beginning in 2005. We test whether the observed relations are affected by the introduction of IFRS. 24 Note, however, that this test is somewhat confounded by at least three factors. First, some countries began issuing additional regulations to "fix" the analyst industry around the time of IFRS adoption. This means that it could be difficult to determine whether any differential relations are attributable to enhanced securities regulations or presumably higher-quality accounting standards. Second, annual market returns during our post-IFRS period are more negative than during our pre-IFRS period. The relations we test could differ in unpredictable ways when market conditions are noticeably worse. Third, our post-IFRS period is relatively short (2005) (2006) (2007) .
We find the following. In the post-IFRS period, residual income valuation estimates continue to be negatively related to recommendations in strong investor protection countries, but significantly less so. For weak investor protection countries, the relation between residual income valuation estimates and recommendations is positive for all specifications in the post-IFRS period.
Residual income valuations continue to be positively related to future returns in both samples, and the positive relation remains greater for the weak investor protection sample in the post-IFRS period. The relation between recommendations and future returns is reduced for both samples. For strong investor protection countries, the relation is negative but insignificant in the pre-IFRS period and then becomes significantly negative in the post-IFRS period. For weak investor protection countries, the relation goes from significantly positive in the pre-IFRS period to insignificantly positive in the post-IFRS period. In general, these results are consistent with the continued greater bias in recommendations in strong investor protection countries.
RESULTS FOR OBSERVATIONS WITH NO CHANGE IN CONSENSUS
Recall that our results are based on using only monthly observations for which there has been a revision in the consensus. We report these observations to be consistent with Bradshaw (2004) . An advantage of this is that it controls for the possibility that analysts in certain countries may not update their recommendations and forecasts as timely as analysts in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, we repeat the tests using the full sample of observations from I/B/E/S data, in other words using observations for which there has been no change in the consensus during a month. This approach has the advantage of significantly increasing the sample size and thus the power of our tests. However, the results are quite similar to those reported previously, which provides some assurance that our findings are not unduly influenced by the use of a smaller sample.
RESULTS USING A CONTINUOUS SPECIFICATION OF INVESTOR PROTECTION
As a final sensitivity test, we use a continuous measure of investor protection, instead of sorting the sample into two groups based on the median of investor protection. We then interact our continuous investor protection measure with each residual income valuation estimate and heuristic. We find that all conclusions remain the same. The differences in coefficients reported
in Tables 3-6 are consistent with the sign and significance of the interaction with our continuous investor protection measure.
Summary
Using a large international sample, this study tests the relations between: (1) stock recommendations and valuation estimates, (2) future excess returns and valuation estimates, and (3) future excess returns and stock recommendations. There has been limited prior research on analysts' stock recommendations in an international setting. Ours is the first to provide a large study of the apparent disconnect between analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Differences related to both accounting systems and analyst activity around the world could affect the way valuation estimates map into recommendations and how these variables relate to future stock returns.
We first show that some of Bradshaw's (2004) surprising results extend internationally.
Specifically, in strong investor protection countries we find that analysts' stock recommendations relate negatively (positively) to residual income valuations (heuristics). In contrast, residual income valuations (heuristics) relate positively (negatively) to future stock returns. Apparently, analysts' earnings forecasts are useful inputs into valuation models but analysts do not appear to use their own forecasts in setting stock recommendations. We document that these counter-intuitive results are less pronounced and tend to dissipate in our weak investor protection sample.
We also demonstrate that the relation between stock recommendations and future returns is negative in strong investor protection countries but positive in weak investor protection countries. Thus, the incremental usefulness of stock recommendations beyond earnings forecastbased valuation estimates is negatively related to the strength of a country's investor protection regime. These results highlight the likely confounding effect of other influences on analyst behavior in the U.S. and other strong investor protection countries. Analysts in these countries have been criticized by the financial community for purposely biasing their stock recommendations to achieve other objectives. Many claim that this behavior is misleading and harmful to investors. Consistent with these complaints, recent regulatory actions in the U.S. have been implemented to lessen such behavior. Our results suggest that some of the empirical irregularities exist internationally. As mentioned in the introduction, future research is needed to further explore the extent to which these findings represent biased analyst behavior or some other rational behavior. 755 SAR = buy-and-hold one-year-ahead size-adjusted return. REC = mean consensus recommendation, 1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Sell, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy, 5 = Strong Buy. V R11 = residual income valuation with a five-year forecast horizon and a terminal value with a fade-rate assumption. V R12 = residual income valuation with a five-year forecast horizon and a terminal value with a perpetuity assumption. V PEG = forecasted earnings per share at a two-year forecast horizon times LTG (x 100). P = share price on the date of the consensus recommendation calculation. LTG = consensus (median) projected long-term growth in earnings. Size = market value of equity. BM = ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Following = number of analysts providing an earnings forecast. Dispersion = standard deviation of the recommendation. Disclosure = the average of six proxies for disclosure requirements (La Porta et al. 2006) . GNP = Logarithmic of per capita Gross National Product (in US dollars) in 2000 (World Development Report 2001; La Porta et al. 2006 ). a All differences in means between strong and weak investor countries are significant at the 0.01 level. b All correlations are significant at the 0.05 level except between LTG and V RI2 /P in both samples and between SAR and V PEG /P in the weak investor protection sample. Regressions are estimated based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizon (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The table presents mean coefficients for these 12 monthly regressions. tstatistics (in parentheses) are based on the standard error of the coefficient estimates across the 12 months, adjusted for autocorrelation in the monthly coefficients based on as assumed AR(1) autocorrelation structure. Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor,
, where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the valuation estimates. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). Independent variables are defined in Table 2 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests. Regressions are estimated based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizon (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The table presents mean coefficients for these 12 monthly regressions. tstatistics (in parentheses) are based on the standard error of the coefficient estimates across the 12 months, adjusted for autocorrelation in the monthly coefficients based on as assumed AR(1) autocorrelation structure. Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor,
, where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the valuation estimates. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). Independent variables are defined in Table 2 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests. The table presents the results of regressions of buy-and-hold annual size-adjusted returns on valuation estimates and consensus stock recommendations. Regressions are estimated based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizon (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The table presents mean coefficients for these 12 monthly regressions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on the standard error of the coefficient estimates across the 12 months, adjusted for autocorrelation in the monthly coefficients based on as assumed AR(1) autocorrelation structure. Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor, , where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the valuation estimates. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). Independent variables are defined in Table 2 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests. The table presents the results of regressions of buy-and-hold annual size-adjusted returns on valuation estimates and consensus stock recommendations. Regressions are estimated based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizon (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The table presents mean coefficients for these 12 monthly regressions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on the standard error of the coefficient estimates across the 12 months, adjusted for autocorrelation in the monthly coefficients based on as assumed AR(1) autocorrelation structure. Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor, , where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the valuation estimates. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). Independent variables are defined in Table 2 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests.
